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SURVIVING PREEMPTION IN A WORLD OF
COMPREHENSIVE REGULATIONS
Kyle Anne Piasecki*
The Clean Air Act imposes a federal regulatory regime on a number of sources
of air pollution. It does not, however, provide a ready means of relief to
individuals harmed by air polluters. Nevertheless, many courts have held that
the Clean Air Act preempts state common law tort claims that do provide a
means to such relief. The disparate benefits of the Clean Air Act and common
law tort claims may indicate different purposes and make court-imposed
preemption of common law tort claims improper. This Comment argues that
the Savings Clause in the Clean Air Act and in parallel state statutes should be
clarified so as to explicitly preserve an injured party’s ability to seek relief
through state common law.

INTRODUCTION
The Earth’s climate is changing in large part because of the release
of airborne pollutants. These pollutants may also cause serious damage
to private property. And yet, the federal government’s major legislation
for regulating air emissions, the Clean Air Act (CAA), provides no
opportunity for individuals harmed by air pollution to seek
compensatory damages if the defendant followed CAA regulations.1
This gap in remedies can be filled through common law tort claims.
However, whether the CAA or its companion state statutes preempt state
common law remains an unresolved question. Part I of this Comment
will discuss basic preemption doctrine and federal courts’ application of
the doctrine to state common law claims regarding air quality. Part II
lays out the more difficult burden state courts have in deciding the
potentially preemptive effect of both the CAA and their own state
companion statutes. While the different purposes of state common law
and the CAA or its companion statutes should weigh against preemption,
some state courts have decided otherwise. Part III suggests possible
solutions that would preserve individual rights secured by common law
claims by (1) embedding an individual right to damages within the CAA

* J.D. Candidate, May 2016, University of Michigan Law School.
1. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a), (e) (2006) (providing the right to citizen suit enforcement but no right
to compensatory damages except through common law).
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or state companion statute or (2) clarifying the inconsistently applied
savings clause in the CAA.
I. FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND AIR QUALITY
A. Federal Preemption in General
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution makes clear
that, where the federal government legislates within its enumerated
powers, these laws reign “supreme” and therefore preempt the states’
laws.2 This preemption prevents state laws from interfering with an
agency’s complex regulatory scheme.3 When conducting a preemption
analysis, “particularly in [cases] in which Congress has legislated . . . in
a field which the States have traditionally occupied,” a court will apply a
presumption that the “historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.”4 The clarity of Congress’s intent will depend on
whether the preemption was express or implied. Express preemption
occurs when Congress explicitly states that the law is preempted.5
Implied preemption takes two forms. The first, “field preemption,”
occurs when federal regulations occupy a field of law almost completely
or when the federal government’s interest in the area of law is so
compelling that state action is not welcome.6 The second form, “conflict
preemption,” occurs when it is either impossible or difficult to comply
with both state and federal law simultaneously.7
Congress can irrefutably avoid the preemption of state law by
including a “savings clause” in an act.8 These savings clauses explicitly
limit the scope of the statute’s preemptive force by stating that the
federal statute shall not be construed to preempt some particular
category of law.9 However, even in areas already receiving a
presumption against preemption (due to traditional state powers), courts
have generally “decline[d] to give broad effect to saving clauses where

2.
U.S. CONST. ART. VI.
3.
J.J. England, Saving Preemption in the Clean Air Act: Climate Change, State Common
Law, and Plaintiffs Without A Remedy, 43 ENVTL. L. 701, 724-25 (2013).
4.
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (internal citations omitted).
5.
England, supra note 3, at 724.
6.
Id. at 724; see, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012).
7.
England, supra note 3, at 724–25; Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2503.
8.
Scott Gallisdorfer, Clean Air Act Preemption of State Common Law: Greenhouse Gas
Nuisance Claims After AEP v. Connecticut, 99 VA. L. REV. 131, 141 (2013).
9.
Id.
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doing so would upset the careful regulatory scheme established by
federal law.”10
B. Preemption of State Common Law Under the CAA
The CAA establishes comprehensive federal air quality standards
and regulates certain hazardous air pollutants emitted from stationary
sources and mobile sources, including motor vehicles and aircrafts.11
The responsibility of achieving these standards is delegated to the states
if they devise a strategy for attainment called a State Implementation
Plan (SIP).12 If the SIP is successful, states retain considerable power to
enforce stricter emission standards by broadening the scope of regulated
stationary sources (by including sources not regulated by the CAA, for
example) and setting stricter standards for stationary sources that are
covered by the CAA.13 In other words, states act as final implementers
of these statutes. This delegation of responsibility to state authority is
known as “cooperative federalism.”14
The CAA does include an express preemption clause regarding
mobile sources: “[n]o State or any political subdivision thereof shall
adopt or attempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of
emissions from new motor vehicles . . . .”15 This includes the preemption
of tort claims under state common law.16 The Act does not include an
express preemption clause covering stationary sources, so, if the CAA
preempts state common law relating to stationary sources of air
pollution, it must be through one of the forms of implied preemption.
Additionally, the CAA includes a savings clause that provides:
“[n]othing in this [CAA citizen suit provision] shall restrict any right
which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or
common law to seek enforcement of any emission standard or limitation
or to seek any other relief.”17 This general rule, however, is limited by an
exception providing that states “may not adopt or enforce any emission
standard or limitation which is less stringent” than that required under
CAA §§ 111 and 112 or the state’s SIP.18
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 141–42.
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7521–7590 (2012)
England, supra note 3, at 707.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a) (2012); 42 U.S.C.A. § 7410(a)(5)(A)(i) (2012).
England, supra note 3, at 725.
42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2006).
England, supra note 3, at 733.
42 U.S.C.A. § 7604 (West 2006).
42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2012) [hereinafter “States’ Rights Savings Clause”].
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The CAA does not prevent states from adopting more stringent
standards than those prescribed by the Act itself.19 The CAA’s States’
Rights Savings Clause reserves for states the right to “adopt or enforce
(1) any standard or limitation respecting emissions of air pollutants or
(2) any requirement respecting control or abatement of air
pollution . . . .”20 Because the CAA only dictates a floor for its
quantitative emissions standard, state common law itself could impose a
stricter standard, just as a state’s companion statute might. Reaching a
stricter standard in these ways still fulfills the state’s obligations with the
lower CAA standard.21 Therefore, source-state common law does not
appear to pose an obstacle to the CAA regime and therefore should not
fall under conflict preemption.
1. Recent CAA Cases
To determine whether field preemption doctrine requires the CAA to
preempt source-state common law, the Third Circuit in Bell v. Cheswick
compared the CAA to the Clean Water Act (CWA).22 In doing so they
turned to International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,23 where the Supreme
Court interpreted the CWA’s citizen suit savings clause and analyzed its
preemptive effects on common law.24 Finding the CAA to be
substantially similar to the CWA and the citizen suit savings clauses to
be nearly identical, the Third Circuit regarded Ouellette as a guide for
determining the preemptive power of the CAA.25 In Ouellette, the CWA
did not preempt source-state common law claims under field preemption
doctrine.26 The Third Circuit found both the CWA and the CAA to be
comprehensive in their fields with citizen suit savings clauses that
protect individuals seeking to invoke state common law.27
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit—three years before Bell, in North
Carolina v. Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)28—voiced concerns that

19.
Id.
20.
Id.
21.
Id.
22.
Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 194–97 (3d Cir. 2013); 33 U.S.C.A. §
1365(e).
23.
Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 482, 497–99 (1987).
24.
Id. at 194–95; Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 482, 497–99.
25.
Bell, 734 F.3d at 195.
26.
Id. at 194–95 (reading the CWA and its Savings Clause to allow states to adopt more
stringent standards through state statutes and state common law).
27.
Id. at 196–97.
28.
North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010).
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state tort law could undermine the CAA’s regulatory regime.29 North
Carolina brought a nuisance suit against the TVA for its emissions that
allegedly harmed North Carolina’s air quality.30 The Fourth Circuit did
not cite Ouellette for its focus on the problems created by allowing
parties from each affected state to bring their state’s common law claims
against one polluter. The court instead read the Ouellette case as a
warning against all common law nuisance actions for fear that they
would interfere with the operation of federal statutes.31 Consequently,
the Fourth Circuit stated that Ouellette intended to preempt nearly all
common law claims.32
In American Electric Power Company v. Connecticut (American
Electric),33 which was decided after TVA, the Supreme Court held that
the CAA fully displaced federal common law because the relief sought
through federal common law—limits on carbon dioxide emissions—
could also be achieved through the CAA’s opportunity for the public to
petition for rulemaking.34 The Court saw no reason for parallel
rulemaking.35 While the Court eliminated one avenue of relief by
preempting federal common law, it notably declined to decide whether
the CAA also preempts state common law claims.36
Following American Electric, a federal district court in Comer v.
Murphy Oil USA37 found state common law nuisance claims to be
preempted by the CAA because these claims called for juries to decide
whether emissions were reasonable.38 The court held that the CAA
required this decision to be made by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).39
In contrast, the Third Circuit in Bell, discussed above, concluded
that Ouellette found that cooperative federalism would allow states to set
more stringent standards through tort law.40 The Bell case involved
particulates released from a generating station that settled in nearby
neighborhoods, making the plaintiffs feel like “prisoners in their [own]

29.
See id. at 303.
30.
Id. at 296–97.
31.
Id. at 303.
32.
See id.
33.
Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
34.
Id. at 2532–33, 2538.
35.
Id. at 2532.
36.
Id. at 2540.
37.
Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849 (S.D. Miss. 2012).
38.
Id. at 865.
39.
Id.
40.
Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 197–98 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Int’l
Paper Co., supra note 23, at 498–99).
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homes.”41 Bell set a rule in the Third Circuit that the CAA does not
preempt state common law claims because the source state may impose
a stricter standard through tort actions.42 This holding could be a
bellwether for other circuits.
C. The Importance of State Common Law
Although an in-depth discussion of the value of tort law in
environmental policy is beyond the scope of this Comment, a brief
overview will frame the discussion to follow.
The circumstances that led to the suit in Bell demonstrate the need
for tort law in this field. Without a claim in tort, the plaintiffs could not
seek redress for their property damage because the defendant abided by
CAA regulations.43 In other words, tort law preserves crucial remedies
for plaintiffs who are not afforded protection by the CAA. Although the
Third Circuit in Bell recognized this gap in compensation, the United
States District Court (in the antecedent case) failed to appreciate these
shortcomings.44 The district court noted that the CAA provides plaintiffs
with various sources of redress to enforce emission standards.45 First, the
CAA allows citizen suits against those who violate regulations issued by
the EPA or the state.46 Second, the EPA “retains the power to inspect
and monitor regulated sources, to impose administrative penalties for
noncompliance, and to commence civil actions against polluters in
federal court,” but “may delegate implementation and enforcement
authority to the States.”47 Plaintiffs, in their reply, explained that they
were seeking money damages, and not enforcement of pre-existing
standards.48 The citizen suit provision within the CAA is, however, not
structured to provide private individuals with money damages.49 Instead,
it may allow for civil penalties to be paid to the federal treasury, but
compensatory damages can, by design, only be provided through state
law.50

41.
Id. at 192.
42.
Id. at 197–98.
43.
Id. at 191–92.
44.
Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 903 F. Supp. 2d 314, 322–23 (W.D. Pa. 2012).
45.
Id.
46.
Id. at 323.
47.
Id. at 322–23 (quoting Am. Elec. Power Co., supra note 33, at 2538).
48.
Id. at 323 (quoting Am. Elec. Power Co., supra note 33, at 2538).
49.
42 U.S.C. § 7604(a), (e) (2006).
50.
Samantha Caravello, Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465,
475 (2014).
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Apart from damages, the common law also offers other benefits,
such as exposing gaps in the regulatory scheme, and many suits of this
kind can spur other government branches to fix these problems.51
II. STATE STATUTES AND EXTRA HURDLES TO STATE COURT RELIEF
A. Continuing Relevance of a Federal Preemption Defense in State Tort
Actions
Although Bell could be viewed as a decisive case, a district court
case in the Fifth Circuit, Cerny v. Marathon Oil Corporation,52 strained
to preserve the defendant’s ability to raise a preemption defense in state
court: “the Court’s holding regarding complete preemption has no
preclusive effect on the state court’s consideration of the merits of a
substantive preemption defense.”53 This suggests that state common law
may be preempted by the CAA in state court, even though it may not be
preempted in federal court. Additionally, state courts may find state
common law to be preempted by their own companion statutes.54
Though claims of state statutory preemption of state common law tort
claims have not been widely litigated in state courts, this type of
preemption defense seems likely in response to Bell. This is especially
true when considering that the CAA gives states authority to regulate
emissions more strictly and across a wider scope than the federal
standards.55 Because the doctrine of field preemption is only invoked
when federal regulations occupy a field of law almost completely, the
more comprehensive environmental regulatory plans are, the more likely
they will fully occupy the field and preempt state common law. This
idea is reflected in a brief by amicus curiae supporting defendant GenOn
Power in Bell. The brief states, “the Clean Air Act ‘is sufficiently
comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no
room for supplementary state regulation.’ This is especially true where
the states are involved in implementing, maintaining, and enforcing the
Act.”56 The brief goes on to discuss the states’ role in deciding the limits

51.
Id. at 476.
52.
Cerny v. Marathon Oil Corp., No. CIV.A. SA-13-CA-562, 2013 WL 5560483 (W.D. Tex.
Oct. 7, 2013).
53.
Id. at 8.
54.
Freeman v. Grain Processing Corp., 848 N.W.2d 58, 70 (Iowa 2014).
55.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2012).
56.
Brief for DRI—The Voice of the Defense Bar as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 3–4, Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 437 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2013) (No. 13-1013), quoting
Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985).
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and types of emissions that each permit holder is allowed to discharge.57
Despite the states’ ability to set potentially more stringent standards,
state courts should still not find these state regulations to preempt state
common law.
B. State Statutes Preempting State Common Law
In determining whether a state statute preempts state common law,
the state court would conduct an analysis similar to the one used to
decide preemption under a federal statute. The preemption analysis starts
with the principle that statutes that abrogate the common law must be
strictly construed.58 Courts should look for a legislature’s explicit intent
to preempt common law. Without an explicit intent, the court should
then consider whether the “statute’s timing, structure and purpose, or
nonspecific statutory language . . . reveals a clear, but implicit,
preemptive intent.”59
The timing test examines whether the state enacted a statutory
regime before the common law tort arose, finding preemption only
where the common law tort arose after the enactment.60 While the
enactment date of common law torts varies from claim-to-claim and
state-to-state, tort claims challenging environmental pollution generally
trace back to the seventeenth century.61 American case law dating back
to the nineteenth century demonstrates how common law causes of
action to address pollution have been part of historic state police
powers.62 Clearly, under a timing-test analysis, state statutes regulating
emissions standards would not preempt state common law tort claims.
Under the field preemption test, legislative intent to preempt state
common law is reasonably inferred based on a sufficiently
comprehensive statutory regime.63 A comprehensive regime effectively
creates a presumption that the statute supplants the common law. The
57.
Id. at 5, quoting Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713
(1985).
58.
See Van Waters & Rogers, Inc. v. Keelan, 840 P.2d 1070, 1076 (Colo. 1992) (en banc)
(“[S]tatutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed, so that if the legislature
wishes to abrogate rights that would otherwise be available under the common law, it must manifest
its intent either expressly or by clear implication.”).
59.
Summit Water Distribution Co. v. Mountain Reg’l Water Special Serv. Dist., 2005 UT
App 66, 108 P.3d 119, 122 (internal citations omitted).
60.
Jarod S. Gonzalez, State Antidiscrimination Statutes and Implied Preemption of Common
Law Torts: Valuing the Common Law, 59 S.C. L. REV. 115, 131 (2007).
61.
Freeman v. Grain Processing Corp., 848 N.W.2d 58, 66 (Iowa 2014).
62.
See id.
63.
Gonzalez, supra note 60, at 131–32.
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breadth of statutory coverage and the available remedies determine
whether the statute is sufficiently comprehensive to invoke field
preemption.64 For example, several courts have held that a state
antidiscrimination statute is insufficiently comprehensive to impliedly
preempt the common law when the remedy under the statute does not
provide an individual remedy to plaintiffs.65 These courts failed to
secure compensatory and punitive damages for injured individuals. As
discussed above, CAA violations may result in violators paying civil
money penalties to the government, but harmed individuals—similar to
the antidiscrimination statute—are left without any monetary damages
remedy.66 The common law, however, provides compensatory and
punitive damages for harmed property owners.67 Because state
companion statutes provide a limited scope of remedies,68 it would be
reasonable to conclude that such state emission standard laws do not
create a regulatory regime so comprehensive that the court should find
implied legislative intent to completely occupy the field and supplant
state common law tort claims.
A third way to deduce implied preemption is to determine whether
the conduct required to bring a state common law tort claim is the same
conduct that is necessary to prove a violation of a state statute.69
Namely, the statute impliedly preempts the common law if it regulates
the same conduct.70 Comparing environmental regulation and nuisance
law, “the differences in the statutory and common law regimes are
demonstrated by what must be shown to establish a violation.”71 The
presence of a nuisance may or may not accompany a violation of a
companion statute.72 In other words, one may be in compliance with
state statutory regulations, but still be liable for a common law tort claim
of nuisance, negligence, or trespass.
Lastly, the independence test provides another means to analyze
possible preemption of state common law. This test considers whether
the harm that constitutes the common law tort claim matches the injury

64.
Id. at 132.
65.
See id.
66.
See supra Part I.C.
67.
See Freeman, 848 N.W.2d at 69.
68.
See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.111 (West 2013) (stating that a person may bring
action against a defendant if that defendant has violated an emission standard set in chapter 455B—
Iowa’s companion statute).
69.
Gonzalez, supra note 60, at 132.
70.
Id. at 132.
71.
Freeman supra note 54, at 70.
72.
Id.
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the state statute is designed to prevent.73 In other words, is the statute
designed to address this injury? Is fixing this problem the statute’s
purpose? If it is, the state statute is more likely to preempt the common
law claim.74 Because the relevant state statutes are designed to
implement the CAA, the purposes of the federal statute are relevant in
analyzing the purposes of the state statutes. Among other purposes, the
CAA is written to “protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air
resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the
productive capacity of its population.”75 State common law tort claims
range in their targeted objectives. Focusing on a typical allegation, e.g.,
nuisance, it is obvious that the common law cause of action seeks to
rectify problems beyond public health and welfare.76 “‘A public
nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to the
general public.’ An interference is unreasonable if the conduct
significantly interferes with the public health, safety, peace, comfort, or
convenience . . . or has a permanent, long-lasting effect on a public
right.”77 In addition, nuisance suits aid those who are disproportionately
affected by pollution,78 rather than the general population, which is the
target of CAA statutes. The purposes and targeted populations of the
CAA and of common law nuisance claims appear distinct.
Consequently, under the independence test, state emission statutes do
not seem to impliedly preempt state common law tort claims.79

73.
Gonzalez, supra note 60, at 133–34.
74.
See id. at 133.
75.
42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 (2006).
76.
See Freeman v. Grain Processing Corp., 848 N.W.2d 58, 63 (Iowa 2014) (bringing
nuisance, trespass, and negligence claims and alleging that the full use and enjoyment of the
plaintiffs’ property was diminished); Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 192 (3d
Cir. 2013) (complaining of noxious odors and “black dust/film . . . or white powder” which requires
constant cleaning); Cerny v. Marathon Oil Corp., No. CIV.A. SA-13-CA-562, 2013 WL 5560483,
at 1 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2013) (alleging that the plaintiffs have been harmed by noxious chemicals).
77.
Adam D.K. Abelkop, Tort Law As an Environmental Policy Instrument, 92 Or. L. Rev.
381, 395 (2013) (internal citations omitted).
78.
Randall S. Abate, Public Nuisance Suits for the Climate Justice Movement: The Right
Thing and the Right Time, 85 Wash. L. Rev. 197, 201 (2010).
79.
Merrick v. Diageo Americas Supply, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 3d 865, 875 (W.D. Ky. 2014), citing
Merrick. v. Brown-Forman Corp., No. 12-CI-3382 (Jefferson Cir. Ct., Div. 9, July 30, 2013) at 4. It
should be noted that states might have additional purposes when implementing statutes that go
beyond the floor set by the CAA. Therefore, a state court analyzing the preemptive effect of a state
statute that more strictly regulates emissions would need to examine the possible additional
purposes of the individual state statute and compare how those purposes relate to the state common
law regime. Such an analysis would require an individualized, state-by-state assessment.
Unfortunately, such a review is beyond the scope of this Comment. It should also be noted that the
Appeals Court of Kentucky reversed the state court decision in Merrick v. Brown-Forman Corp.,
No. 2013-CA-002048-MR, 2014 Ky. App. LEXIS 178, at *9-10 (Ky. Ct. App.). Though this is the
only example in which a state court has held state common law to be preempted by the CAA, it is
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C. Some State Courts Have Found State Common Law Federally
Preempted
The Jefferson Circuit Court, a state trial court in Kentucky, found
that the CAA preempted the state’s common law.80 It did so despite the
fact that the common law in question predates the CAA, preserves
different remedies, is triggered by different conduct, and is aimed at a
disproportionately affected population. The court acknowledged the
reasoning of the Third Circuit in Bell, but chose to follow the reasoning
and holding of the Fourth Circuit in TVA.81 The Jefferson Circuit Court
noted that the application of common law tort could undermine the
regulatory structure established by the state under the CAA.82 However,
another Kentucky lower court found that the CAA and state statutes do
not preempt state common law tort claims.83
The Iowa Supreme Court also reached a different conclusion than
the Jefferson Circuit Court.84 In Freeman v. Grain Processing
Corporation, residents based their claims on common law nuisance,
trespass, and negligence, while the defendant claimed that the Iowa
companion statute to the CAA, Iowa Code chapter 455B, preempted
these claims.85 The Iowa court found that the state’s common law
purpose—redressing harm to an individuals’ enjoyment of their
property—and the CAA’s purpose—upholding the public interest in
controlling emissions—did not overlap.86 The court concluded that the
Iowa legislature, therefore, did not provide a comprehensive scheme for
nuisance-type disputes and the Iowa CAA companion statute did not
preempt Iowa common law.87 This overturned the trial court’s holding
that state nuisance laws were unpredictable enough to interfere with the
state’s complex regulatory scheme.
As mentioned above, state statutory preemption of state common
law has not been widely litigated in state courts.88 If state statutory

important to discuss this possibility of preemption as state companion statutes can be stricter and
broader—making them more likely to be preemptive—and because it is possible that these
relatively recent cases are the first of many.
80.
Id. at 875.
81.
Id. at 875.
82.
Id.
83.
Mills v. Buffalo Trace Distillery, Inc., No. 12-CI-00743 (Franklin Cir. Ct., Div. 2, Aug.
27, 2013) at 3.
84.
Freeman v. Grain Processing Corp., 848 N.W.2d 58, 70 (Iowa 2014).
85.
Id.
86.
Id. at 88.
87.
Id. at 89.
88.
See supra Part II.A.
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preemption arguments become more prevalent in courts,89 it will be
necessary to explore the contours of states’ CAA companion statutes to
determine whether each state’s emission regulations supplant its own
state common law tort claims. To the extent that the CAA alone does not
preempt a state common law claim, the state statutory analysis will take
on increased importance.90 One such contour is the “no more stringent
than” provisions in some state SIPs—which bars a state’s ability to
impose standards above the minimum “floor” set by the CAA.91 For
example, Pennsylvania’s Air Pollution and Control Act’s (APCA)
companion regulations, 25 Pa. Code §§ 121–141, are also promulgated
pursuant to the CAA. In other words, the standards set by the CAA and
by the state are coextensive.92 In United States v. EME Homer City
Generation, the federal district court found that the CAA and the APCA
preempted state common law nuisance claims.93 In doing so, the court
cited TVA: “where Congress has chosen to grant states an extensive role
in the Clean Air Act’s regulatory regime through the SIP and permitting
process, field and conflict preemption principles caution at a minimum
against according states a wholly different role and allowing state
nuisance law to contradict joint federal-state rules so meticulously
drafted.”94 EME Homer was decided before Bell.95 Under EME Homer’s
logic, if the CAA preempts state common law, then state statutes parallel
to the CAA would also preempt state common law. One may logically
assume that the reverse would hold true as well; that is, a court could
reasonably find that if state common law is not preempted by the CAA,
then it should not be preempted by parallel state enforcement statutes.
On the other hand, if a state emission statute were significantly more
comprehensive, the question of preemption would prove more complex.
These inconsistent preemption findings across federal circuits and in
state courts must be addressed.

89.
See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
90.
See Justin A. Savage & Madeline Fleisher, Clean Air Act Preemption, Daily Env’t Rep.
(Bloomberg BNA), Apr. 18, 2014, at 4.
91.
Id.
92.
United States v. EME Homer City Generation L.P., 823 F. Supp. 2d 274, 294 (W.D. Pa.
2011).
93.
Id. at 297.
94.
Id.
95.
Id. at 274; Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 188 (3d Cir. 2013).
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III. PROPOSED REFORM
There are three relatively straightforward ways to resolve the
preemption problems discussed above, establish the legitimacy of tort
claims, and secure relief for injured individuals. Congress can amend the
CAA (1) to create an individual cause of action under the CAA and an
avenue for individual redress within the statutory scheme aimed directly
at remedying the harms addressed by relevant state common law tort
claims (e.g., nuisance, trespass, and negligence) or (2) to clarify the
CAA’s citizen suit savings clause, making it explicit that state common
law is not preempted by the CAA. Lastly, because the CAA does not
limit state companion statutes from providing more expansive
protection, state legislatures could also implement the first and second
proposed reforms by amending their companion statutes.
A. Creating an Individual Cause of Action for Damages Under the CAA
Either Congress, by amending the CAA itself, or individual state
legislatures, by amending their CAA companion statutes, could simply
and definitively answer the preemption question and secure an
individual remedy for injured parties by creating an individual cause of
action and damages within their respective statutes. This solution would
cause the CAA to fully occupy the field of clean air regulation and
clearly preempt state common law because the harms formerly remedied
only by the common law could instead be remedied under the CAA.
This solution should involve an avenue for individual redress within the
CAA. Pursuant to this amendment, a comprehensive system would be
implemented to handle all possible nuisance grievances. This option has
certain benefits. For example, a committee, or some deciding body with
authority that has an in-depth familiarity with the regulatory framework
of the CAA, could propose solutions that serve disproportionately
harmed individuals, while avoiding interference with the complex CAA
scheme. Creating an entire grievance regime would, however, be very
costly because it would require resources to create and enforce federal
statutes aimed at the same harms as state common law. And, considering
the idiosyncrasies of many nuisance, trespass, and negligence cases,
designing and implementing a streamlined, uniform process for
addressing every case could be very challenging. Considering the CAA’s
reliance on cooperative federalism, a more feasible solution in the spirit
of the Act would be to allow the states to manage individual relief
mechanisms—either through their own grievance regimes or the existing
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state common law.
B. Amending the CAA’s Citizen Suit Savings Clause
The second main approach to addressing the problem of state and
federal preemption of common law tort claims is to clarify the citizen
suit savings clause in the CAA to make it explicit that state common law
is not preempted by the CAA. This could be accomplished by
eliminating the words “this section” from the CAA’s citizen suit savings
clause96 to avoid the false impression of a limited reach. The citizen suit
savings clause currently states: “nothing in this section shall restrict any
right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute
or common law to seek enforcement of any emission standard or
limitation or to seek any other relief.”97 State citizen suit savings clauses
may contain similar language. For example, the citizen suit savings
clause in Iowa Code § 455B.111(5) provides, “this section does not
restrict any right under statutory or common law of a person or class of
person to seek enforcement of provisions of this chapter.”98 Based on
precedent, defendants may argue that this language saves the common
law only for that particular section.99 In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, the
court held that the language of the citizen suit savings clause “cannot be
read to mean that the Act as a whole does not supplant formerly
available federal common law actions but only that the particular section
authorizing citizen suits does not do so.”100 Without the words this
section, defendants would have difficulty applying a field preemption
argument by arguing that the citizen suit savings clause in the CAA does
not preserve a plaintiff’s state common law claim.
In addition to removing any possible limiting language, the citizen
suit savings clause should also clearly state that state common law is not
preempted. A comparable example is the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act, which includes a citizen suit savings clause that
permits any state common law action.101 With this level of clarity, courts
more easily decipher the legislature’s intentions. This ease is emphasized
in one judge’s interpretation of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act: “It does
not take a genius to figure out that the preemption clause tells states that
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See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a) (2012).
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IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.111 (West 2013) (emphasis added).
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 327–28 (1981).
451 U.S. at 329 n.22.
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they cannot have any nonidentical laws in any area which is governed by
federal regulations, and for those areas in which there are no regulations,
the states can still apply their common law.”102 Under this reasoning,
individuals should still be able to apply state common law for issues
such as nuisance and trespassing that are not covered by the federal
regulations.
If states choose to include a citizen suit savings clause in their
companion statutes, they should model it after the proposed amended
CAA provision to avoid inconsistency between state and federal parallel
statutes—inconsistencies such as state statutes preempting state common
law while matching federal statutes would not preempt state common
law. This latter solution of clarifying the language in the CAA’s citizen
suit savings clause would likely be a relatively easier means of resolving
the preemption question favorably because it would merely secure the
continuation of common law enforcement.
C. Likely Criticism
Businesses may criticize these legislative changes. As voiced in
TVA, companies believe that allowing state common law claims will
create concerns of business operability.103 Companies may fear
becoming burdened with unpredictable layers of regulation as
individuals demand standards that differ from federal and state-regulated
emission levels, arguably upsetting the comprehensive nature of the
regime.104 The court in Ouelette addressed this concern in its holding
with respect to the CWA:
[T]he restriction of suits to those brought under source-state
nuisance law prevents a source from being subject to an
indeterminate number of potential regulations. Although
[source-state] nuisance law may impose separate standards and
thus create some tension with the permit system, a source only is
required to look to a single additional authority, whose rules
should be relatively predictable. Moreover, States can be
expected to take into account their own nuisance laws in setting
permit requirements.105
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In addition to multiple sources of scrutiny, companies may also
worry that some judgments made while upholding state common law
will lead to haphazard regulations unsupported by scientific findings.106
As a former EPA attorney stated, “[t]ort liability, by its very nature, is
not a product of technical experts working together and analyzing all of
the factors that are enumerated in the environmental statutes.”107
However, stricter emissions standards enacted by states are generally
contemplated through state administrative law and scientifically driven
standards. Further, a company’s compliance with applicable federal and
state standards may be sufficient to show that a company’s emissions do
not cause the level and type of injury necessary to give the plaintiff
standing.108 Also, compliance with standards set by technical experts
may demonstrate that a defendant acted reasonably and according to the
standard of care.
This understanding of compliance with regulations as a partial
defense against common law tort claims may quell some companies’
fears that they will be held liable under divergent standards. In addition,
the benefits served by allowing state common law claims—providing
damages to harmed individuals, exposing gaps in the regulatory scheme,
and motivating other branches to take steps to fill these gaps—may very
well justify this added layer of inconvenience to companies.
CONCLUSION
Courts in different federal circuits and across different states are
split in their application of federal preemption to state common law or
companion state statute preemption to state common law. When courts
have held the common law to be preempted, disproportionately harmed
individuals are left without a remedy. In order to limit inconsistent
holdings among courts and to further purposes beyond regulatory
compliance—most notably securing relief for individuals’ injuries—
Congress should clarify the citizen suit savings clause in the CAA and,
where applicable, state legislatures should similarly amend their state
companion statutes.
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